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According to a recent opinion poll that covered seven members of the
Eurozone, Spain would be the Member State of this group that is most in
favor of leaving the euro. In this public opinion context, and above all since
the summer of 2012, debate has been growing in this country about the
prospects of its exiting the European Monetary Union. In this article I
argue that there are good reasons for taking this debate seriously. Using
Spain as a case study, I analyze what the determinants of this decision
could be. In particular, I analyze the economic determinants that could
condition a decision in this direction. I conclude that in the current
situation, a Eurozone member's decision to leave the common currency
would be conditioned, in economic terms, above all by time and fairness.
Therefore, a key element that a member of the Eurozone would have to take
into account when considering whether to leave the euro would be twofold:
1) the extent to which this decision would prompt a faster adjustment; and
2) the extent that exiting would cause a fairer distribution of the costs of the
adjustment.
I. PUBLIC OPINION AND SPAIN'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROZONE
In opinion poll after opinion poll, Spain emerges as the member of the
Eurozone most in favor of exiting the common currency. For example,
according to the 2013 edition of the Marshall Fund "Transatlantic Trends,"
30 percent of Spaniards would be in favor of this option (see Table 1 and
* Jean Monnet Professor ad personam of Law and European Economic Governance and
Professor of Administrative Law, University Carlos III of Madrid. A longer version of this
article was published by the EUI Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies under the
title "Determinants of Spain's decision to leave the European Monetary Union." See RSCAS
2013/56.
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Figure 1, infra pp. 338-39).1 It is essential to note that in the previous
edition of this poll in 2012, 27 percent of Spaniards wanted to leave the
Eurozone. 2 Therefore, in just one year the percentage of Spaniards that
would want to see Spain exiting the Eurozone had increased by three
points. The results of this poll are consistent with domestic polls that
regularly ask Spaniards about this issue.3
This result is indeed noteworthy for three reasons. First of all, Spain
has traditionally been one of the most pro-European Member States of the
European Union. Secondly, although Spain is undergoing profound
economic hardship, this situation cannot be compared to that of Member
States similar to Spain (except in the field of unemployment). And thirdly,
but no less importantly, the country has been able to avoid a full bailout.
Accordingly, the feeling that the country has been taken over by the
Troika is probably less intense than in other Member States that have
received a full bailout. One would assume that these circumstances would
attenuate Spain's blame on Europe in general and on the euro in
particular. However, the opposite seems to be the case.
Talk of Spain's exit has been going on since at least June 2012. At that
time, the Spanish risk premium was skyrocketing. Public media reported
that in a number of meetings between the recently elected Popular Party
government and other European governments-in particular the German
government-Spanish top officials threatened Spain's exit if specific
assistance measures were not taken. 4 It is impossible to verify the extent
1. See Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE U.S.
(2013), http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2013/09/TT-Key-Findings-Report.pdf, at 25 [hereinafter
Transatlantic Trends 2013]. Interestingly, the question on Euro-exit was removed from the
survey in its 2014 edition. See Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2014, GERMAN MARSHALL
FUND OF THE U. S. (2014), http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ Trends_2014_complete.pdf
[hereinafter Transatlantic Trends 2014]. Therefore, the question of whether the nationals of a
Eurozone member would prefer to stay or leave the euro was only made for the 2012 and 2013
editions of this survey. However, the question of whether people think that being a member of
the Eurozone has been good or bad for the respondents' country is still asked in the 2014
survey. In 2014, 62% of the Spaniards thought that being a member of the Eurozone had been
"bad' for Spain (only one percentage point less than in the 2013 survey). Transatlantic Trends
2014, at 29.
2. See Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2012, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE U.S.,
http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf, at 20 [hereinafter
Transatlantic Trends 2012].
3. See, e.g., La Majoria Apuesta por el euro, INSTITUTO DYM (May 2, 2012),
http://www.institutodym.es/ca/actualidad/la-mayoria-apuesta-por-el-euro/ (finding 34% of
Spaniards think that Eurozone exit would be good for Spain) (Most Bets on the Euro). See also
Jos6 Pablo Ferrndiz, Rescatados, quizd, pero con euros, EL PAIS (May 21, 2012), available at
http://blogs.elpais.com/metroscopia/2012/05/rescatados-quiza-pero-con-euros.html (finding 27
% of Spaniards think that exit would be the best option) (Rescued Perhaps, But With Euros).
4. The debate began after the Spanish media leaked that the Director of the Economic
Office of the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Alvaro Nadal, was considering strategies for Spain
POTENTIAL EXIT FROM THE EUROZONE
to which this story is true. What is clear is that this information prompted
public debate on the issue in the country. The result of this debate is the
growing tendency of the Spanish people to think that some economic relief
could be found outside the Eurozone.
This article is radically agnostic as to the costs and benefits that a
decision in that direction would have for Spain and for the Eurozone as a
whole. To the best of my knowledge, there is no single serious academic
study that computes the economic, social, and political consequences that
such a decision would have for both Spain and the European Union, as a
whole. My objective is, therefore, not to discern whether Spain would or
should leave the euro. The objective is, rather, the more humble one of
offering a preliminary discussion about the main economic determinants
that a country would have to take into account if it were considering
adopting a decision of this kind. Spain is used as a case study, but the
conclusions of this article are of a general nature.
To approach the issue of the economic euro-exit determinants, I shall
therefore proceed in the following way. A first point is to try to understand
when countries have more propensities to leave currency unions. A look-
be it cursory-at the history of currency unions is needed here. A second
point also has to do with history, since being more inclined to leave
currency unions does not say anything about the positive prospects or
negative consequences derived from this event. There are countries that
after leaving a currency union (or a similar arrangement) have been very
successful, while others have not been successful. It is important thus to
understand what made some successful and others not. Furthermore, if
there had been no success stories, then the question of whether to leave
would be futile. EU Member States would not even contemplate this
option had there been no success stories throughout the history of
currency union exits.
Finally, it is also important to try to identify what variables make the
time ripe for considering a decision of this magnitude. But before we deal
exiting the euro. See e.g., Ignacio Escolar, Un sector del Gobierno Plantea Amenazar a
Alemania con Romper el euro, ESCOLAR (2012), http://escolar.net/MT/archives/2012/06/ un-
sector-del-gobierno-plantea-amenazar-a-alemania-con-romper-el-euro.html (threatening
Germany with a Eurozone breakup without financial assistance). The debate was further
fired up when three Spanish economists published an article in the Spanish newspaper El
Pats in which they argued that leaving the euro would be equivalent to going back to the
"Spain of the 50s." See Jes6s Fern6ndez-Villaverde et al., No queremos volver a la Espaila de
los 50, EL PAIS (June 1, 2012 7:40 CET), available at
http://elpais.com/elpais/2012/05/31/opinion/1338475092_453958.html. See also Jes6s Rivas6s,
Un gran negocio llamado Espala, TIEMPO (June 22, 2012 10:41), available at
http://www.tiempodehoy.com/opinion/j esus-rivases/un-gran-negocio-llamado-espana (making
reference to Spain's exit from the Euro as one of the alternatives that Rajoy's government
contemplated in June 2012).
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with the previous points, it is necessary to account for the causes and
consequences of the current economic situation in Spain. I turn to this
point in the next section.
Table 1: The Euro, bad or good?
Generally speaking, do you think that using the euro in
[COUNTRY] [WITHIN THE EUROZONE: has been / OUTSIDE THE
EUROZONE: would be] a good thing or a bath thing for the [COUNTRY]
economy?
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2014, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED
STATES (2014), http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_ToplineData.pdf, at 66.
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Figure 1: Should I leave or should I stay?
Chart 13:
Leave or Stay in the Eurozone?
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Source: Transatlantic Trends 2012, supra note 2, at 20.
II. THE CURRENT SPANISH ECONOMIC DOWNTURN
A. The European Variable
To better grasp the causes of why Spain is experiencing the current
economic situation, it is necessary to take into account three important EU
institutional features. The first two are contingent, the third is more
structural. The two contingent features have to do, first, with the powers
of the European Central Bank (ECB), and second, with the no-bailout
clause. The third is, as I said, more structural. It has to do with the EU
decision-making process.
I will not expand on any of these features, since they are all well
known. The European Central Bank's (ECB) powers are basically limited
to the control of prices.5 It is true that the ECB must also be concerned
5. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts.
127, 140, 282, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Protocol (No 4): On the
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Sept.
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 32) 230; Protocol (No 13): On the Convergence Criteria, Sept. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 281.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:2
with the "general economic policies in the Union."6 But even if we afforded
this a generous reading, as the ECB has probably done recently, there is
consensus in the sense that the ECB lacks powers to prompt economic
growth and fight against unemployment-tasks that the Federal Reserve
unquestionably has in the United States. 7 As things were going well, as
they basically did until 2007-2008, the debate about the exact contours of
the ECB powers remained an academic one. However, in the midst of the
crisis, discussion about the ECB's statute has spread and even reached the
public square.8 This is indicative of a growing public discomfort with the
role that the ECB is playing in EU monetary governance.9 To be sure,
uneasiness with the ECB's performance is higher in southern European
countries than in northern ones. 10 Therefore, the debate on the proper role
for the ECB, among other things, further illustrates the growing cleavage
that exists between the north and the south of the European Union. 11
6. See TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 127(1) ('The primary objective of the European System
of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as 'the ESCB') shall be to maintain price stability.
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general
economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives
of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European
Union. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with
free competition, favoring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the
principles set out in Article 119").
7. See 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act) ('The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall
maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the
economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." (emphasis
added)).
8. It is interesting to note that when the Euro started circulating as physical currency in
2002, 74% of Spaniards said that they "had heard about the ECB," whereas 23% had not.
Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union, Report 58, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(2003), at B. 115 [hereinafter Eurobarometer 58]. In 2014, 92% of Spaniards had heard of it,
whereas 7% had not. Standard Eurobarometer 81: Tables of Results, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(2014), at T55 [hereinafter Eurobarometer 81], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/public-opinion/archives/eb/eb8l/eb8l anx en.pdf.
9. Again, for example in 2002, 52% of Spaniards trusted the ECB, whereas 21% did not,
and in 2014, 14% trusted the ECB and 77% did not. Eurobarometer 58, supra note 8 at B. 117;
Eurobarometer 81, supra note 8, at 92.
10. For example, in Germany, in 2014, 38% of Germans said the trusted the ECB, whereas
4% did not. Eurobarometer 81, supra note 8, at 92.
11. According to the Marshall Fund, the "[n]orth-[s]outh [d]ivide [w]idens in Europe."
Transatlantic Trends 2014, supra note 1, at 30. This survey finds a correlation between
people's sentiment on how the crisis is affecting them and the extent to which they blame the
EU. Therefore, the more they feel they are affected by the crisis, the more they blame the EU.
For example, in Germany, 30% of the respondents said that they felt personally affected by
the crisis, whereas in Spain 81% felt they were personally affected by the crisis. Id. In turn, in
Germany 60% said that the EU was not doing enough to combat the crisis, whereas in Spain
88% thought that the EU was not doing enough to fight against the crisis. Id.
POTENTIAL EXIT FROM THE EUROZONE
The second feature of EU economic governance that I mentioned
before was the no-bailout clause. According to this clause, if a Member
State faces economic difficulties, and it cannot pay its debts, then there is
neither an obligation from the rest of the Member States nor from the
European Union as a whole to help it. The idea behind this was that
Member States should understand that there would be no safety net from
the European Union (or from the rest of the Member States) in case they
should run amok. 
12
The no-bailout clause was complemented with a number of provisions
regarding the proper functioning of the euro. In particular, the
Functioning Treaty gave powers to the EU institutions to reinforce its
stakes, vis-A-vis Member States doing the wrong thing. 13 This formed the
"constitutional" basis of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP): a number of
measures (both preventive and reactive) that the EU institutions might
adopt in the case in which a Member State overshot its public deficit and
debt limits as established by the EU Treaties. The idea behind the SGP
was that the bad members of the European Monetary Union should be
castigated for it, and no provision was established in order to "help"
Member States in difficulties. If anything, Article 136 of the Functioning
12. See TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 125(1). This article is duly supplemented by TFEU art.
123. Id. at art. 123. The latter article establishes two rules: firstly, that the ECB cannot bail
out member states, and therefore cannot act as a lender of last resort for this purpose; and
secondly, that the ECB can only buy sovereign debt in secondary markets and not directly
from the member states. Randall Henning and Martin Kessler argue that the EU no bailout
clause finds inspiration in the US tradition on this issue. These authors reconstruct the
historical process through which the United States of America introduced the no-bailout
clause in the 19th century. These laws were enacted in the 1840s, after nine American states
had defaulted. See R. Daniel Kelemen & Terence K. Teo, Law, Focal Points, and Fiscal
Discipline in the United States and the European Union, 108 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 355, 355 n. 1
(2014). The main reason for this is that at that time, fiscal federal powers were already
important enough to ensure that other federal programs could compensate for the prohibition
of bailouts. According to the authors, "the US experience suggests that the particular path
through which rules are adopted and enforced is likely to be critical to their implementation
and that introducing such rules for euro area member states should be accompanied by a
federal system of fiscal powers and a common fund for rescuing and recapitalizing banks." C.
Randall Henning & Martin Kessler, Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's
Fiscal Union 18 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 12-1, 2012). In other words,
one cannot have one (a no-bailout clause) without the other (strong fiscal federal or central
powers). See id. To have the first without the second is therefore to have the worst of both
worlds.
13. See TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 126; See also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union, Protocol No. 12 On the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Sept. 5, 2008, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 1.
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Treaty seemed to open up the door for measures different from sanctions,
although it did so in a rather ambiguous and diffuse manner. 14
It is important to recall at this point that those Member States that
had fought hard to obtain a stringent SGP, (e.g., France and Germany),
were the ones that disruptively forced its reform in order to give it more
flexibility from 2003 onward, something that they achieved with the first
reform of the SGP in 2005. This story is well known and does not have to
be repeated here in detail. 15 Suffice to say that in 2003 these two countries
ran public deficits and debts that went beyond their respective limits as
set by the SGP. Both Member States united to provoke its reform.
However, this was not a story of victims on the one hand and villains on
the other. The roles of victims and villains were mixed: France and
Germany had the support of other countries, specifically of the countries
that could be doing worse under a more stringent SGP.16 These Member
States saw in this an opportunity to advance their own particular
interests. But this is probably not the point. After all, one cannot blame
the worse off for being rational and therefore jumping onto the bandwagon
of modulating the SGP's old rigors. The point is, rather, that it created a
pervasive impression that the EU economic governance rules, and above
all, its monetary rules, were hand-tailored for the principal beneficiaries of
the monetary union. This, it is submitted, had profound consequences for
the way in which, later on, markets viewed the capacity of the European
Union to solve the current economic crisis. 17
14. See TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 136. In fact, Article 136 of the TFEU has been
amended by European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 in order to introduce a third
paragraph. See Council Decision 2011/199/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1. The third paragraph
establishes the possibility to create a European Stability Mechanism. This amendment
entered into force on May 1, 2013, after the EU Councils Secretary General received
notification by the Czech authorities of the completion of the ratification procedure in this
member state. Directorate General for the Presidency & Directorate for Relations with
National Parliaments Legislative Dialogue Unit, Table On the Ratification Process of
Amendment of art. 136 TFEU, ESM Treaty and Fiscal Compact, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
(Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/1833.
15. See generally LUDGER SCHUKNECHT, ET AL., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE STABILITY
AND GROWTH PACT. CRISIS AND REFORM, 129 OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 10 (2011) (providing
a summary on how France and Germany fought to achieve reform of the SGP in 2005).
16. Spain, in particular, supported French and German attempts to reform the SGP. See
Cristina Serrano and Begona Montoro Zulueta, El Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento
[Stability and Growth Pact], 2905 BOLETIN ECONOMICO DE ICE 3, 7 (2007). According to the
authors, "Spain adopted a flexible stance throughout the re-negotiation of the SGP, showing
particular sensitivity and understanding towards France and Germany's problems." (author's
translation).
17. An impression probably not mitigated by the fact that the SGP was reformed again in
2011. Also under French and above all German pressure, this time the aim was to reintroduce
more discipline and rigor to European monetary governance. See SCHUKNECHT ET AL., supra
note 15, at 18.
POTENTIAL EXIT FROM THE EUROZONE
The last element that closes this institutional triangle is the EU
decision-making process. As previously stated, this element is more
structural, whereas the other two elements are more contingent. With this
I mean that though, at least in theory, it would be conceivable to have an
ECB with enlarged powers, and also a different EU economic and above all
monetary governance setting, it is instead very hard to imagine how the
EU decision-making process could be made less cumbersome and complex.
It is not only that size matters here (at the time of this writing, the
European Union contains twenty-eight Member States and is still
growing). It is also that real convergence among Member States (political,
economic, and social) is far from evident.18 Therefore, complex decision
making is likely an idiosyncratic feature of the European Union, such as it
is now. It is also probable that the complexity of the EU decision-making
process negatively impacts the reform prospects of the other two elements
mentioned above. Stated in different words, if one had to establish a sort of
hierarchy in regard to the three explanatory variables we are commenting
on, the EU's complex and cumbersome decision-making process would
preside over the other two.
The fact of the matter is that it takes a lot of time for the Union to
make decisions, and this is increasingly evident. 19 This delay occurs
ordinarily, but it is the case in extraordinary circumstances as well.
Decision-making lags are problematic under the first; they are utterly
fatal under the second. It makes it simply impossible to quickly react to
the changes brought about by very volatile contexts, such as the current
one. The example of the timespan that elapsed since the European Union
first started to talk about establishing a Permanent Stability Mechanism
(the European Stability Mechanism, or ESM) to help Member States with
difficulties, until it definitively adopted one, is very illustrative of this
trend.
As we have said before, the no-bailout clause was the first obstacle.
Therefore, the EU Treaties needed to be amended to establish an
assistance mechanism. Member States had to negotiate such a
modification. Then Member States had to bargain about the exact
contours of the new financial vehicle. The third step was to make a
18. See generally Antonio Estella, European Union Scenarios for 2017, 1-29 (Royal
Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 39, 2008) (assessing several outcomes for the EU in 2017
based on current trends).
19. According to Thomas Kbnig, the EU decision-making process has on average slowed
down in recent years. While the median proposal time lag was about 100 days until the end of
the 1980s, it increased in the early 1990s to 140 days. In general, Kbnig gives flesh to an
intuitive argument: as the EU augments divergence through enlargement to new member
states with different interests, the decision-making process slows down. See Thomas Kbnig,
Divergence or Convergence? From Ever-Growing to Ever-Slowing European Legislative
Decision Making, 46 EUR. J. POL. RES. 417, 419 (2007).
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decision about the best way to fund the new mechanism. Further, the
ESM had to enter into force. The total time that elapsed since the
beginning of this operation was two years, and this is taking into account
that the ESM is not part of the European Union law framework.20 The
lourdeur of the EU decision-making process, its difficulty to make
decisions even under pressing extraordinary circumstances, has even been
echoed in the political sphere: for instance, Spanish Prime Minister
Mariano Rajoy has repeated on different occasions that the EU is
"desperately slow."
21
B. The National Perspective
It is against this institutional context that one has to project the
events that unfolded after the bursting of the subprime crisis and the
subsequent collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As the
general story is already known 2 2 I will only refer to the Spanish
specifics. 23 It is by now very clear that the euro helped to create a credit
bubble in Spain. This credit bubble was mainly channeled to the housing
market in this country. Fishman attributes this precisely to the lack of a
powerful and dynamic industrial sector in the vast majority of the
20. First high-level conversations about the issue can be traced back to the Deauville
Summit (October 2010) that was held between Russia, Germany and France. At this summit,
Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy issued a joint statement in which they called the EU to
draw proposals to establish a Permanent Financial Assistance Mechanism. See France-
Germany-Russia Summit, Oct. 18, 2010, Franco-German Declaration; See also EU Agrees to
Merkel's Controversial Euro Reforms, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 29, 2010, 1:26 PM),
http://www.spiegei.de/international/europe/brussels-summit-eu-agrees-to-merkel-s-
controversial-euro-reforms-a-726103.html. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was
later on established as a Public International Law Treaty. This Treaty entered into force on
September 27, 2012 (except for Estonia, for which it entered into force on October 4, 2012).
The Mechanism was inaugurated on October 8, 2012. See generally EUROPEAN STABILITY
MECHANISM, http://www.esm.europa.eu/index.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
21. Fernando Garea, Rajoy: 'La UE se Mueve, Aunque a un Ritmo Desesperadamente
Lento" [the EU Moves, Even if at a Desperately Slow Pace], EL PAdS (Oct. 31, 2012, 6:32 PM),
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/10/31/actualidad/1351673513 108674.html.
22. See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, END THIS DEPRESSION Now! (2012) (reviewing the fiscal
crisis of 2007); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 199-222 (2009) (exploring general economic trends over
time, and noting their repetitive nature); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010) (assessing in particular how the
failure of U.S. financial markets had disastrous consequences on the global economy).
23. See generally Eloisa Ortega & Juan Penalosa, The Spanish Economic Crisis: Key
Factors and Growth Challenges in the Euro Area, BANCO DE ESPANA: DOCUMENTOS
OCASIONALES, no. 1201, 2012 (examining the fiscal crisis in Spain, and determining if lack of
adaptability to the macro-economy of EMU membership was and continues to be a factor).
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country.2 4 Therefore, the credit bubble prompted a real estate bubble.
Money being cheap, virtually everyone had access to real estate
ownership. However, as this was happening, a mirroring process of
increasing prices came about. Real estate prices were increasingly high,
but people could afford them due to the substantial capital inflows that
were coming to Spain, specifically, from northern EU countries. Both
bubbles were reinforcing each other. The more the credit bubble grew, the
more the real estate bubble grew. In turn, as the real estate bubble grew,
there was an increasing demand for cheap money. The result was an
impressive increase in real exchange rates and therefore a loss in the
competitiveness of the Spanish economy.
2 5
This is not to suggest that this process was automatic. It was simply
rational for economic actors to want to access real estate in general and
housing in particular since money was cheap and housing rental prices
were high. It was also rational for Spanish creditors to keep pumping
money into the Spanish economy since there was a demand for it, and, as
the real estate market was expanding, the solvency of debtors was never
put into question. If the subprime crisis and in particular Lehman
Brothers collapse had not happened, it is very probable that Spain would
not be in such a harsh economic situation today. But Lehman did collapse
and, overnight, capital inflows to Spain started decreasing. Therefore,
credit was less available than before in Spain, and, in a question of
months, it almost came to a halt. With no credit, the real estate and
housing markets bubbles burst.
Spanish economic operators, and above all real estate market agents,
turned their eyes to the Spanish government. The Spanish government
came to the rescue. The first step was a typical, neo-Keynesian, reaction.
If, due to the lack of credit, the housing demand had stopped, then it
should be stirred again. Therefore, Spain spent around 100 billion euros in
just a couple of years in trying to reactivate the housing and public works
sectors again.
26
It worked for a while, and the hope was that the crisis would not be as
profound as was proven afterward. Spain had accumulated a budgetary
surplus during the previous years; the government used it, but the crisis
24. The exception being the Basque country, where the coordinated efforts of industry and
policy makers made it possible to channel credit to small and medium enterprises, rather than
to the housing and real estate sectors. See Robert M. Fishman, Anomalies of Spain's Economy
and Economic Policy Making, 31 CONTRIBUTIONS TO POL. ECON. 67, 71 (2012).
25. See JOSE FERNANDEZ-ALBERTOS, DEMOCRACIA INTERVENIDA: POLfTICAS ECONOMICAS
EN LA GRAN RECESION [INTERVENED DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE GREAT
RECESSION] 51 (2012).
26. Spain implemented the "Plan para el Estimulo de la Economia y el Empleo" (Stimulus
Plan for the Economy and Employment), popularly known as Plan "E," from November 2008
until 2010.
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worsened and the surplus was over. Spain started running up public
deficits. The downward trend was more worrisome than the actual
numbers. In 2009, Spain had not only spent its surplus but also overshot
the public deficit and debt limits established by the Stability and Growth
Pact.
It is at this point that our three institutional elements, previously
mentioned, enter the scene. In the same way that economic operators had
turned their eyes to the Spanish government, now it was the Spanish
government's turn to ask the European Union institutions for assistance.
But the answer from Europe was three-fold. First, the ECB was there to
keep inflation rates under control-not to rescue states that had run
amok. Second, there was no financial assistance mechanism with enough
firepower to contain Spanish hemorrhaging. Third, decisions could be
taken, but this would need the support of most if not all Member States
and therefore would take time. In other words, Spain had suddenly
discovered that it was trapped in the EU institutional triangle that I
described above.
Financial markets soon realized that Spain was trapped in the
institutional triangle just described and that an exit from it would be very
hard to find. Without the help of the European Union-and in particular
of the ECB, which was reluctant to monetize the Spanish debt-markets
were less willing to lend money to the country. Spreads between Spanish
bonds and German bonds started skyrocketing.2 7 The situation got more
complicated when markets, probably to their delight, observed that as
cumbersome as it might be, the main answer from Europe was in the form
of austerity. What initially was a liquidity problem turned into a real
solvency one, since the outcome of austerity was stagnation (when not
economic deflation) (see Figure 2, infra p. 347) and high unemployment
(see Figure 3, infra p. 348). The end of this story is well known: once the
27. Spanish risk premium started its escalating trend on April 14, 2010. A month later, on
May 7, 2010, the Spanish risk premium was at 162 basis points. The government took the
first budget cuts a few days later, on May 12, 2010, and the Spanish risk premium decreased
to 103 basis points. However, the success of these measures was short-lived: only a month
later, on June 17, 2010, the Spanish risk premium was at 216 basis points. The Spanish
spread with German bonds reached its historically highest point on July 24, 2012 (637 basis
points). Days later, on July 26, 2012, Mario Draghi made a statement saying that the ECB
was ready to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro. Mario Draghi, Verbatim of the Remarks
Made By Mario Draghi: Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at
the Global investment Conference in London, EUR. CENT. BANK (July 26, 2012),
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. After that statement, the
spread between Spanish 10-year bonds and German ones decreased to 351 basis points by
January 18, 2013. At the time of this writing (October 2014), the Spanish risk premium is at
around 150 basis points (therefore, not very far away from the level in which it was days
before the first budget cuts were adopted in May 2010). For the evolution of Spanish risk
premium, see infra Figure 15.
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ESM was activated, Spain had to ask for a bailout for its banking sector, to
which the ESM adjoined stringent conditionality. The first tranche of the
bailout was disbursed in December 2012 and the second in February 2013.
Spain formally exited the bailout program in December 31, 2013, but, at
the time of this writing, the chances that it will have to recur to the ESM
again in the future have not completely faded away.
Figure 2: Spain's GDP growth as annual percentage 2006-2013
6
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European Union (28 countries)- Euro area (18 countries)
Source: GDP andMain Components - Volumes, Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/nui/show.dodataset-nama-gdp k (last updated Dec. 8, 2014).
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Source: Unemployment Rate - Annual Data, EUROSTAT, http://ee.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/
table.dotab-table&init 1&language-en&pcode-tipsun20&plugin 1 (choose the "Graph" tab;
then choose the "Data" tab, select "2013" and click "Refresh"; then choose the "Sort and label"
tab, select "Descending," and click "Refresh") dlast visited Mar. 27, 2015).
III. THE EXITER'S PROFILE
We may now turn to the analysis of the economic determinants of
euro-exit. In a path-breaking study on currency unions, Andrew K. Rose
analyzes exit from currency unions after the Second World War.28 He
compares sixty-nine cases of exit, in which countries have left currency
unions, with sixty-one cases in which countries belonging to currency
unions did not leave. From these cases, Rose establishes what could be
called an "exiter's profile."29 His findings are therefore relevant to our
discussion. 30 According to the author, "exiters tend to be larger, richer, and
28. See Andrew K. Rose, Checking Out: Exits from Currency Unions, 19 J. FIN.
TRANSFORMATION 121, 128 (2007).
29. That is to say, the characteristics of countries that have more propensity to leave
currency unions.
30. Roger Bootle points out the following as regards Rose's analysis: "the countries
included in [Rose's] study have little in common with the euro-zone" since "they are mostly
small, post-colonial economies which used the currency of a larger neighbour or a colonial
power. Many used currency boards which continued to issue their own currency but pegged it
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more democratic than stayers."31 However, Rose also warns against
overshooting these differences, since they tend to be "persistent" but
"sluggish."32 In my opinion, this warning should be understood in the
sense that it is important to be very specific and detailed about the
mechanisms that are at play in this domain. Rose's findings are the
following:
When one considers all the variables simultaneously, only
five show through with sizable effects. The size and
income of the country are both strongly positively
associated with monetary independence, consistent with
Alesina and Barro (2002). More democratic countries and
those with larger government sectors are systematically
more likely to have their own currencies. Finally, inflation
is higher with currency union exiters than stayers, though
the causality here is ambiguous. High inflation countries
may find it more difficult to remain with currency unions,
as their competitiveness cannot be regained through a
nominal devaluation; but countries with their own money
may simply have systematically less disciplined monetary
institutions and accordingly higher inflation. More
democratic countries and those with larger government
sectors may find it easier to respond to asymmetric
macroeconomic shocks, but are less likely to remain in
currency unions. 33
Rose's article relates the three main conditions that he finds to be the
best predictors of exit (e.g., size, wealth, and democracy) with the following
measures. First, size and wealth are understood in terms of population,
firmly to an "anchor" currency. What's more, few if any of these countries had large external
or public debts and few, if any, had uncompetitive currencies. But it is these issues of debt and
competitiveness which are the key problems faced by the euro-zone." Roger Bootle et. al,
Leating the Euro: A Practical Guide, WOLFSON ECONOMICS PRIZE 2012, at 18,
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/WolfsonPrize/woIfson / 20
economicso20prizeo20winning%20entry.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). However, as the
same authors recognize later on in the same study, the problem is that there is no case in
history similar to the one of the Eurozone. See id. at 72. There are cases in which a whole
monetary union collapsed, but there are no cases in which one of the members of a monetary
zone left. See id at 18-19, 72-73. Even if probably incomplete, Rose's analysis is therefore a
good point of departure to answer the question of which states have a greater tendency to
leave currency unions
31. See Rose, supra note 28, at 122.
32. See id at 122.
33. See id at 127.
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real GDP per capita, openness (exports plus imports), direct government
spending, and investment. Other measures that he includes are inflation,
budget balance, money growth, and the national accounts. Rose uses a
number of different sources for calculating these measures. 34 However, he
uses the Penn World Tables as a default source of information, which he
complements with the others when some specific information is missing.
Clearly, some of these measures are more related to size, some others are
more related to richness, and others again are arguably related to both.
For example, population and GDP per capita are related to size and
wealth, respectively. Government spending may be related to both size
and richness. In turn, openness and investment may be also related to
both. In any event, I will proceed in the same way Rose does to understand
the position of Spain in terms of size and wealth but, for the sake of
simplifying my analysis, will use only some of the measures he finds of
relevance to account for each of these variables. Therefore, I will use
population as a proxy of size, government spending as a proxy of size and
wealth, and GDP per capita (PPP) as a proxy of wealth. I also include GDP
(PPP)-which Rose does not include-to give a further measure of both
size and wealth. However, I exclude inflation and trade (openness), since
according to Rose, none of them are clear determinants of exit. 35 Further,
instead of using the World Penn Tables (since data for some variables is
not updated to recent years), I use the CIA World Factbook (which offers
much more up-to-date information).
In regard to democracy, Rose uses the Polity series of the University of
Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict. The Polity
Series codifies countries according to a number of characteristics of
governing institutions. This allows Polity to offer an index of 167
countries. In this index (see Figure 4, infra p. 352), countries are codified
as "full democracies," "democracies," "open anocracies," "closed anocracies,"
"autocracies," or "failed/occupied." Furthermore, within each of these
categories, countries are given a specific score, which allows for
comparison within each group and also to account for changes in single
countries. For example, the lowest score that countries belonging to the
second category (democracies) can obtain is +6, and the highest is +9.
However, only full democracies get a single score: +10.
34. See id. at 123-24 (stating that Rose uses the "Penn World Tables (version 6.2)," the
"World Bank's World Development Indicators," and the "International Monetary Fund's
International Financial Statistics" for calculating the listed measure).
35. See id. at 127 ("[I]nflation is higher for currency union exiters than stayers, though the
causality here is ambiguous," and there is an "absence of any strong tie between the
importance of trade and currency union membership.").
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Table 2: Spain's position in the world: Population, GDP,
Government Budget, GDP per capita and Democracy
Variables Spain's Position in Ranking
Population 29 (2014)
GDP (PPP) 15 (2013)
GDP per capita (PPP) 47 (2013)
Budget Size (revenues) 10 (2013)
Democracy Highest (2013)
Sources: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (5 1st ed. 2014), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (multiple pages); POLITY IV,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm (last updated June 5, 2014).
Data for all variables on Spain are summarized in Table 2. Starting
with the latter aspect (democracy), and irrespective of the criticisms that
the Polity Score has received 36 (the Index can be more useful to measure
transitions between different political regimes than evolution within fully
institutionalized democracies), Spain is placed in the group of States that
are labelled as "full democracies," and therefore it obtains the highest
score (+10) (see Figure 4, infra p. 352).
36. See generally Gerardo L. Munck & Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring
Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. (2002) (evaluating the
weaknesses of democracy indices).
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Figure 4: Polity IV, Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013




Full Democracy (10) * Closed Anocracy (-5 to) W
Democracy (6 to 9) * Autocracy (-10 to -6)
Open Anocracy (1 to 5) * Failed/Occupied * Not included
updated June 5, 2014).
Furthermore, with regard to size, if measured by population, Spain
occupies position twenty-nine (out of 240 countries that appear in this
index).37 If measured by GDP, Spain's place in the world is number fifteen
(229 countries). 38 Finally, in terms of the size of the government budget
(measured as revenues), Spain occupies position number fifty-six, out of
233 countries surveyed.39
However, regarding GDP per capita (a measure of a country's wealth),
Spain occupies position number forty-seven in the world (out of 228
37. Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison Population, in THE WORLD
FACTBOOK, (51st ed. 2014), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html.
38. Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), in
THE WORLD FACTBOOK (51st ed. 2014), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/200lrank.html.
39. See Central Intelligence Agency, Field Listing: Budget, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK (51st
ed. 2014), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
fields/2056.html.
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countries that are included in this ranking).40 The severe Spanish
economic downturn that started in 2007 explains (in part at least) the
position that Spain occupies today.4 1 However, even with these figures in
mind, it is still possible to argue that Spain belongs to the medium-to-high
countries in the world in terms of wealth.
42
In conclusion, this data gives a preliminary indication that in terms of
Population, GDP, Budget Size (which are proxies for both size and
richness), and Democracy, Spain would probably belong to those countries
that are more susceptible to leaving currency unions. In terms of wealth (if
measured as GDP per capita) the analysis, however, is less conclusive.
Nonetheless, it is also possible to think that if the effect of the crisis could
be controlled for, then Spain would probably be placed as regards this
variable in a better position to leave currency unions, as other rankings
seem to indicate.
IV. COUNTRIES' OUTCOMES AFTER LEAVING CURRENCY AREAS OR
DEVALUATING: ARGENTINA AND SOUTH KOREA COMPARED
As we have seen in the previous section, countries that in the past
have left currency unions have certain characteristics. I also showed that
Spain fits that profile, given the qualifications that have been mentioned
therein. However, the previous analysis does not tell us anything-as it is
not its main purpose-about whether those countries that left currency
unions were successful or not, and if so, to what extent. I undertake that
analysis in this section.
The problem of comparing the situation in which Spain, or another
member of the Eurozone, finds itself with other historical cases is that it is
quite unprecedented. As I have already mentioned, there is no similar case
in history. This is the point that Bootle et al. make. 43 According to these
authors, the major historical cases of currency breakups are the Austro-
Hungarian Empire after 1918, the rubble zone after the USSR was
dissolved in 1991, and the Czech-Slovak monetary union of 1993. It would
also be possible to add other cases to the list. For example, the collapse of
40. Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: GDP-Per Capita (PPP), in THE
WORLD FACTBOOK (51st ed. 2014), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.
41. Spain's position in this ranking may also be due to methodological issues. For example,
France is in position number 39, the EU in position number 41, and the UK is in position
number 34. Id.
42. See, e.g., Tina Aridas & Valentina Pasquali, The World's Richest and Poorest
Countries, GLOBAL FINANCE (June 14, 2013), http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/
economic-data/i1934-richest-poorest-countries.html#axzz2BeSQFnC5 (ranking Spain in
position number 31 out of 184 countries surveyed and ranked from richest to poorest).
43. See Rose, supra note 28.
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the Latin monetary union or the breakup of the Scandinavian currency
union.44 However, Bootle et al. also indicate that we are speaking here of
cases in which the breakups occurred for political rather than for economic
reasons. Furthermore, it could be added that they were also cases
in which the economic conditions were very different from those today, in
which international financial markets have experienced an unprecedented
expansion. 45 A final aspect would be to point out that in all of these cases,
we are speaking of the whole currency union breakup and not of cases in
which one of the members of those currency unions left. Bootle et al.
sensibly recommend focusing on more recent cases, in which the countries
in question had high levels of external debt (be it public, private, or both).
They also recommend focusing not on currency breakups (very rare in
history as I have said) but rather on cases in which the countries in
question largely devalued their currency and partially defaulted. These
authors focus, in particular, on the following cases: Argentina in 2001-
2002, Russia in 1998, and East Asia in 1997. There is no single account, to
my knowledge, that analyzes and compares all historical cases in which
countries have devalued and defaulted.
46
44. See generally Kee-Hong Bae & Warren Bailey, The Latin Monetary Union: Some
Evidence on Europe's Failed Common Currency, 1 REV. DEV. FIN. (2011) (examining the
financial and economic record of the Latin Monetary Union); Lars Fredrik Oksendal, The
Impact of the Scandinavian Monetary Union on Financial Market Integration, 14 FIN. HIST.
REV. (2007) (examining the significance of the Scandinavian Monetary Union). It has to be
noted that the main difference between both monetary union experiences (i.e., the Latin and
the Scandinavian) and the European Monetary Union is that in the former ones, the
respective currencies of the members of the monetary union did not disappear. This is the
main reason why any parallelism between the Latin and the Scandinavian currency unions
and the EMU has to be approached with care.
45. For example, according to Philip R. Lane, "the expansion in cross-border financial
positions for the advanced-economy group .. .rose from 68.4% [GDP] in 1980 to a peak of
438.2% [GDP] in 2007 .... While the IFI ratio plunged in 2008, it subsequently recovered
during 2009-2010." Philip R. Lane, Financial Globalisation and the Crisis 3 (Bank for Int'l
Settlements (BIS), Working Paper No. 379, 2012). Another measure of financial markets'
current hypertrophy is the growth that the derivatives markets has experienced in the last 15
years; thus according to A Rashad Abdel-khalik and Po-Chang Chen "[d]uring the fifteen-
year period between 1995 and 2012, total amounts of financial derivatives have increased by
1,200%, a rate that significantly outpaces the growth of both the [World GDP] (240%) and [US
GDP] (212%)." A Rashad Abel-khalik & Po-Chang Chen, Growth in Financial Derivatives:
The Public Policy and Accounting Incentives, J. ACCT. & PUB. POLY, at 1 (forthcoming 2015).
According to the same authors, the volumes in OTC derivatives for 1995 and 2012 were,
respectively, of $57.5 trillion and $696 trillion, while the world GDP was, respectively, of $30.2
trillion and $72.4 trillion. Id. at 1-2. This means that while in 1995, OTC derivatives volumes
amounted to more or less two times the world GDP volume, in 2012 they amounted to more or
less ten times the World GDP volume.
46. See Generally Michael D. Bordo & Lars Jonung, The Future of EMU- What Does the
History of Monetary Unions Tell Us? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
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In this section, I will compare two of the cases suggested by Bootle et
al. that could be useful for this discussion. These cases are Argentina from
2001 to 2002 and South Korea in 1997. Argentina is a clear case in which
a country left a currency board. In turn, Korea is a case of a country
breaking not a currency board but a peg with the dollar. Currency boards
and pegs are, of course, not monetary unions, but, taking into account that
there are no cases of countries leaving monetary unions, they can be used
as useful proxies of them.
A. Argentina 2001 2002
Argentina experienced an unprecedented economic boom during the
1990s, particularly, from 1992 to 1998. However, for many observers, at
the same time the boom was taking place, Argentina was planting the
seeds of a serious economic downturn in the late 1990s. The Argentinian
economy was hit by the 1998 recession with a number of structural
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities included increasing public debt, low
share and high concentration of exports, the economy's reliance on
external savings, and a very rigid labor market. The "currency board" is
also cited among the vulnerabilities of the Argentinian economy of the
time, but how this affected the unfolding of the crisis in that country is less
clear.
In this context, the East Asian crisis exploded in 1997. It spread to a
number of countries, in particular, to Brazil, which devalued its currency
(the real) in 1999. This had a direct effect on Argentina: exports went
down, interest rates up, and internal demand contracted in this country.
Due to the labor market rigidity, inflation initiated an increasing trend,
and the spreads of the Argentinian bonds started to grow, as compared to
the spreads of other economies in the region. The economy entered into
depression in 1999-2000, and Argentina seemed to be trapped in a
downward spiral of high prices, low growth, and soaring public debt,
among other problems. In particular, public debt increased by more than
ten basis points from 2001 to 2002 (see Figure 5, infra p. 356). 4 7 Further,
as the economy was very marginally export oriented, exit through that
7365, 1999) (using the historical records of other monetary unions to predict the outcome of
the EMU).
47. According to the IMF, Argentina "doubled" its public debt/GDP ratio from 1992 to
2001. In 1992, Argentina public debt was of 30.7%, in 2001, it was of 62%. Compared to
current debt/GDP ratios in euro-zone countries like Spain, Argentina's figure may not seem
very remarkable. However, more important than that is the negative trend that these data
reveal in terms of public debt to GDP ratios in this country. IMF, ARGENTINA: STAFF REPORT
FOR THE 2002 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION 31 (Dec. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.imforg/external/pubs/f't/scr/2003/crO3226.pdf.
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door was not possible in the short run. The only alternative was to leave
the currency board.
Figure 5: Argentina government debt (1998-2008)
ARGENTIRA GOVERNMENT DEBT TO GDP
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Source: Argentina Government Debt to GDP, TRADING ECON.,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/argentina/government-debt-to-gdp (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).
It is, however, very interesting to see how the main international
institutions resisted the option of leaving the currency board. For example,
in its "Lessons from the Argentinian Crisis" of 2003, the IMF stated the
following:
Exiting the currency board via dollarization would not
have solved this dilemma, while a float-which could have
helped, in principle, to jumpstart the economy through a
large depreciation-would have had major adverse
repercussions via domestic balance sheets (including the
public sector's large dollar denominated liabilities). 48
As a matter of fact, IMF help was initially oriented toward supporting
the currency board, until the Argentinian government realized that this
was a daunting task. Therefore, President Duhalde (the fifth president
Argentina had had in three weeks) confirmed in January 2002 the debt
moratorium that had been declared by President Rodriguez SaA on
December 23, 2001. More importantly for our purposes, under the
leadership of Roberto Lavagna (who would afterwards be appointed
48. IMF POL'Y DEV. & REV. DEPT, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA 58 (Oct. 8,
2003).
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Minister of Economy), President Duhalde made the decision to leave the
currency board.49 The IMF opposed these decisions, since in its opinion
they "complicated any eventual resolution of the criSiS."5 0 Indeed, the
immediate consequences of these decisions were harsh for the Argentinian
economy: in 2002, GDP fell to -11 percent, unemployment rose to around
18 percent, and the inflation rate peaked to 40 percent. As to the exchange
rate, in March 25, 2002, the peso reached a peak of 4 Argentinian pesos
per dollar (see Figure 6, infra p. 358).51 Finally, in terms of equality of
income distribution, the country was negatively hit by the crisis. Therefore
in 1999, when the crisis started in Argentina, this country's GINI index
was 49.81. From that point it started an increasing tendency, which had
its highest peak in 2003, when Argentina reached a GINI index of 54.72.








Source: Argentinian Peso, TRADING ECON., http://www.trading
economics.com/argentina/currency (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
49. The law that served as the basis for this decision was the Ley de Emergencia P6blica y
de Reforma del R6gimen Cambiario [Law for the public emergency and reform of the rate
exchange system]. Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002 (Arg.), available at
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/digesto/leyes/ley25561.htm.
50. See IMF POL'Y DEV. & REV. DEPT, supra note 48, at 62.
51. See IMF, supra note 47, at 51. Considering that the peso was at par with the dollar (1
peso-1 dollar) after the break-up of the convertibility, this means a nominal depreciation of
400%. In real exchange rate terms, the peso suffered a depreciation of 54.7% in 2002. Id. at 41.
However, these figures pale if they are compared with the current Argentina Central Bank
reference exchange rate between the peso and the dollar, which is 8:4 pesos for a dollar at the
time of this writing.
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However, in 2003, Argentina came out of the crisis. Due to
devaluation, exports started growing. This had an immediate effect on
GDP, which soared to 8.8 percent in 2003. With regard to unemployment,
in 2003 it was already below 16 percent, and it stabilized at around 8
percent as of 2008. Regarding inflation, it stabilized to around 4 percent in
2003 (see Figure 7, infra p. 359). Clearly, high inflation, besides
unemployment, was the main battlefield in this country after the crisis of
2001-2002. Finally, in terms of equality, in 2004, the country had almost
returned to the pre-crisis situation (GINI of 50.2). Since then, the GINI
index has decreased and, in 2010, was at its lowest level (GINI of 43.6)
since 1992 (see Figure 8, infra p. 359).
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Source: Argentina Inflation Rate, TRADING ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
argentina/inflation-epi (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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Source: GINI Index (World Bank Estimate), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SI.POV.GINI/countries/1W-AR?display-default (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
B. Korea 1997
The Korean crisis that started in 1997 offers another interesting
example of the effects of devaluation on a depressed economy. It is,
however, important to mention that the situation in Korea and Argentina
differ in one important aspect: where in Argentina there was a currency
board, Korea only had its national currency (the won) pegged, with a
certain degree of flexibility, to the dollar before the crisis exploded in 1997.
This is the point that Stanley makes. In his account of the different
approaches to the Argentinian and Korean crises (1997-2002), he
indicates that "until 1995, Korea remained pegged... to the dollar. After
that date, exchange rate flexibility went up considerably."52 Therefore,
whereas the Argentinian economy was dollarized before the crisis started
in that country, the Korean economy was not. It follows that withdrawing
from the currency board had a very different meaning for Argentina than
devaluating did for Korea.
Korea is another case in which the crisis was preceded by a large
period of intense economic growth. As happened in Argentina, this
extraordinary growth probably masked the main vulnerabilities of the
52. Leonardo E. Stanley, Capital Inflows, Bank Deregulation and Financial Institutions:
From Repression to Crash? Argentina and South Korea Compared 15-16 (Working Group on
Dev. and Env't in the Americas, Discussion Paper No. 32, 2011).
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Korean economy. According to the literature on the Korean crisis, these
vulnerabilities were, basically, of two kinds: first, Korea had a feeble
financial system, and second, it also had a very weak corporate
management system. As often happens, both trends were mutually
reinforcing. In practice, capital inflows to Korea were "directed" by the
government to finance big family conglomerates, the so-called "chaebols."
The system was so corrupt that authors, such as Kang 53 have constructed
the concept of "crony capitalism" on the ashes of the Korean example. As
financial management was very weak, the government could decide what
conglomerates deserved to be financed and which firms did not. The
"chaebols" received financial assistance that was, in many cases,
irrespective of their performance. The financial assistance was also used
as an instrument for political financing.
In any case, the Korean private sector was already highly leveraged in
the mid-1990s. This is also one of the main differences between the
Argentinian case and the Korean case. While in Argentina the public debt
was soaring before the crisis, the problem in Korea was not one of public
debt but rather of private debt. For example, Figure 9 shows that the
domestic credit to the private sector experienced an important increase
from 1994 to 1996. Instead, government debt remained, in the period
before the crisis broke up, at very reasonable levels (see Figure 10, infra p.
361). In addition to this, Kim and Chang indicate that the debt to equity
ratio was also problematic at the time of the crisis (338 percent between
1973 and 1996).
54
Further, Korean banks were very indebted in the short run, whereas
Korean big conglomerates were leveraged in the long run. In this vein,
Chan, Park, and Yoo report that from 1994 to 1996, 64 percent of the total
foreign borrowing was short term, and 85 percent of the lending was long
term.55 On top of that, the government issued a number of signals in the
1990s, assuring that it would not let the conglomerates fall. This implicit
guarantee added to the capacity of the conglomerates to finance
themselves at low costs and artificially expand beyond market constraints.
53. See generally, DAVID C. KANG, CRONY CAPITALISM: CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES (2002) (discussing the negative effects that political
corruption have had on the development of the South Korean economy).
54. Ginil Kim & Doug Joo Chang, Rethinking the Causes of the Korean Currency Crisis of
1997, 18.2 KOREAN J. ECON. 360, 362 (2011).
55. Ha-Joon Chang, Hong-Jae Park & Chul Gyue Yoo, Interpreting the Korean Crisis:
Financial Liberalisation, Industrial Policy and Corporate Governance, 22 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 735, 739 (1998).
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Figure 9: South Korea domestic credit to the private sector
(1990-2002)
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Source: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (Oo of GDP) in South Korea, TRADING ECONOMICS,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-korea/domestic-credit-to-private-sector-perent-of-
gdp-wb-data.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
Figure 10: South Korea government debt (1996-2008)
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Source: South Korea Government Debt to GDP, TRADING ECON., http://www.trading
economics.com/south-korea/government-debt-to-gdp (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
This was the economic situation in Korea when the currency crisis of
the East Asian countries unfolded. The devaluation of the Thai baht in
July 1997 rapidly infected the rest of the countries in the area. At first it
seemed that Korea would be sheltered from the crisis. But, as interbank
credit shrunk, Korean banks started suffering. The credit crunch affected
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the big Korean conglomerates, and some of them in fact went bankrupt.
This harmed the good health of the Korean economy and reduced the
overall credibility of the country. It seemed that Korean firms could in fact
go bankrupt after all.
In turn, the Korean won started a free fall in September and October of
1997. According to the IMF account of the Korean crisis, the depreciation
was initially very gradual, but, already by December, one dollar was
exchanged for 2,000 wons (where in September of the same year it was
traded at 910 wons per U.S. dollar) (see Figure 11, infra p. 363). In fact the
first action taken by the IMF (when it was called in to assist the country)
and the Korean government was aimed at stabilizing the currency. In the
words of the IMF, the rescue package was oriented toward avoiding the
devaluation and inflation spiral that had been experienced in past cases. In
this respect, the IMF recommended implementing very tight monetary and
fiscal policies. Therefore, interest rates increased, and the currency was
stabilized (and even appreciated in the following months). However, the
literature on the Korean crisis is divided on the question of the causes that
prompted the stabilization of the won. For the IMF, this was an immediate
effect of the austerity fiscal and monetary policies. It even finds correlation
between the increase in interest rates and the stabilization of the won.
Instead, Furman and Stiglitz find that the connection between both
variables is unclear. For these authors:
[A] range of other factors helped to stabilize these Asian
currencies, including the appreciation of the yen, changes
in the governments of all three countries, disbursements
of official foreign financial support .... the restructuring
of IMF programs away from overly strict fiscal policies and
immediate bank recapitalization, and the restructuring of
Korea's commercial bank debt. Again, high interest rates
may have helped support the stronger currencies, but the
magnitude of the effect was probably not that large.56
Be it as it may, Stanley remarks that the effects of the depreciation of
the Korean won were soon to be noticed. According to him, this generated
an important export recovery, which created a surplus of 41.7 billion
dollars. This in turn allowed the building of an important buffer of foreign
exchange reserves. In the aftermath of the crisis, in 1998, Korea's GDP
decreased to an unprecedented -6.65 percent. However, the GDP
experienced an impressive growth of 10.5 percent shortly after in 1999. In
56. See Jason Furman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from
East Asia, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1, 121 (1998).
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regard to unemployment, it peaked to a historical 8.6 percent at the
beginning of 1999. However, Korea closed that year with a 6.3 percent
level. Since then it has remained stable between 3 percent and 4 percent.
As per inflation, it is important to mention that Korea entered the 1997
crisis with a more flexible labor market than Argentina. Therefore,
devaluation was not translated into a rise in labor costs, so inflation was
kept under control. Thus in 1998, the inflation rate increased to around 7
percent. However in 1999 it decreased to less than 1 percent to further
stabilize between 2 percent and 4 percent in the next years (see Figure 12,
infra p. 364). It is also important to mention, in this regard, that one of the
conditions required by the IMF financial package was to establish CPI
inflation targeting, which Korea has done since 1998.57 Last but not least,
in terms of equality, Cheon and others report that inequality of income
distribution was low in Korea before the 1997 crisis (GINI index of 0.26 in
1996). When the crisis hit the country, inequality started a rising tendency
(GINI index of 0.29 in 1998) to descend to almost pre-crisis levels (GINI
index of 0.27) in 2009. However, these authors also point out that after
2003 inequalities have experienced a rebound in this country, so that the
GINI index was 0.31 in 2011.58
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Source: South Korean Won, TRADING ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-
korea/currency (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
57. See Alexander W. Hoffmaister, Inflation Targeting in Korea: an Empirical Exploration
(IMF, Working Paper No. 99/7, 1999) (describing different methods and success rates of
inflation measurement systems in South Korea).
58. CHEON ET AL., GROWING INEQUALITY AND ITS IMPACTS IN KOREA, GROWING
INEQUALITIES' IMPACTS (GINI) 90 (2013), available at http://giniresearch.org/system/
uploads/439/original/Korea.pdP1370077269.
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Source: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.
org'indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG/countries/KR?dispaygraph (dast visited Apr. 1, 2015).
C. Parallelisms and Differences
The conclusions we may extract from the comparison between the
Argentinian and the Korean cases are complementary. For one, it is clear,
as Stanley suggests, that the depreciation of the Korean won from
September to December 1997 had an important effect in boosting exports.
However, the effects of devaluation were less clear in the Korean case than
in the Argentinian case since the currency had recuperated at least part of
its exchange value by 1998. Furthermore, in the Korean case, there was no
default (not even partial default).
The Korean and Argentinian cases both differ from and equal the
Spanish case. They differ in the sense that Korea did not have a public
debt problem when the crisis started, nor as the crisis unraveled. Spain
did not have a public debt problem when the crisis started, but it did in
time. Argentina did have a public debt problem at the beginning of its
crisis (at least in trajectory). But the Korean case is similar to Spain in the
sense that when the crisis started, Korea had a private debt problem (as
Spain did at the beginning of the crisis) (see Figure 13, infra p. 365).
In more general terms, one could argue that currency disequilibrium
during the last part of 1997 was in Korea more an effect of the overall
East-Asian crisis that had started in Thailand and not so much a cause of
it. However, in the Argentinian case, it is clear that the currency board
was to an important extent a catalyzer of the ensuing crisis. The IMF tried
both in the Argentinian case and in the Korean case to stabilize the
currency; however, in the latter case it was more successful whereas in the
former it was not. Accordingly, the Argentinian government broke up the
currency board, which proved to be crucial for the ultimate recovery of the
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country, whereas in the Korean case a depreciated but stabilized won was
a starter for economic recovery.
The Argentinian and the Korean cases also differ in another important
aspect, that is, in structural reforms. Korea adopted structural reforms.
They were mainly oriented at breaking and eliminating the "chaebols"
system. The structural changes were successful in reforming its corporate
and banking systems. However, unlike Korea, Argentina did not embark
on a sustained path of structural reforms. Sound and sustainable
structural reforms may be at the heart of the differences in performance of
each of these economies some years after the crisis and even today.
Currently, where Korea is still a promising economy, one that does not
present serious macroeconomic challenges, Argentina may instead be on
the verge of a new economic downturn. The lesson from this seems to be
clear: devaluing, breaking a peg, and leaving a currency board or even a
monetary union would be useless in the absence of more in-depth
structural reforms. However, what is still unclear is which exact blend of
reforms is the appropriate one for a given country.
Figure 13: Public, private, and accumulated (public + private)
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Source: Eurostat (2002-2013).
V. TIME AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
The third important determinant that a country that is in the middle
of an economic depression has to take into consideration when thinking
about exit from a currency union is the time factor. When is the time ripe
for considering such an event?
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In this sense, when analyzing the Argentinian crisis of 2001-2002,
Hausmann and Velasco 59 underline the importance that the real exchange
rate, the financial stress of the country, and its export prospects had in
accounting for the crisis. According to these authors,"To make sense of
what went wrong, one has to focus on the interaction of two factors: real
exchange rates ... and the country's capacity to borrow abroad .... In our
framework, export prospects determine the access of financially
constrained countries to external resources."6 0 Interestingly, one of the
main conclusions both authors reach is that Argentina's decision to break
the currency board was a good decision made at the wrong time. According
to the authors, Argentina should have broken the currency board well
before it finally did.61
The main implication derived from Haussmann and Velasco is that
when the three previously mentioned variables enter into a downward
spiral, the state that is suffering such hardship should react immediately
by devaluing its currency, or in our case, by exiting the monetary area.
"The sooner, the better" seems to be Haussmann and Velasco's main
implication. So let us apply Haussmann and Velasco's scheme to the
Spanish case. For example, in 2013, Spain's real effective exchange rate
was around 0.30 points above the German one-in general terms, at least
since 2005, Spain has been suffering from an endemic currency
overvaluation problem when compared to other EU countries, and in
particular, when compared to Germany (see Figure 14, infra p. 367).
59. See generally Ricardo Hausmann & Andr6s Velasco, Hard Money's Soft Underbelly:
Understanding the Argentine Crisis, BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM (2002) (describing several of
the underlying fiscal issues that led to and exacerbated the Argentine debt crisis).
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 29.
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Furthermore, once the economic turbulences started in 2007-2008,
Spanish spreads started to grow from "huge to the obscene," to use the
same expression that Haussmann and Velasco used for the Argentinian
case.6 3 It is important to remember once again that, although at this point
Spain did not have a public debt problem, it did have a problem of private
debt (see Figure 13, supra p. 365). Thus the Spanish risk premium in April
12, 2010, was 67 basis points; however, in just one month (by May 7,
2010), it had escalated to 162 basis points, and in June 25, 2012, when
Spain formally requested a bailout for its banking sector, the Spanish risk
premium was 516 basis points.6 4 It would reach its highest historical point
62. REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate) is defined as a variable that "measures the
development of the real value of a countrys currency against the basket of the trading
partners of the country." Zsolt Darvas, Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: A new
database 1 (Bruegel Working Paper No. 2012/06, 2012), available at
http://www.bruegel.org/download/parent/716-real-effective-exchange-rates-for- 178-countries-
a-new-database/file/1630-real-effective-exchange-rates-for- 178-countries-a-new-database/.
This variable is used for a number of purposes, inter alia, assessing the equilibrium value of a
currency, the change in price or cost competitiveness, the drivers of trade flows, or incentives
for reallocation production between the tradable and the non-tradable sectors. I use this
measure in the first sense indicated above. See id.
63. See Hausmann & Velasco, supra note 59, at 6.
64. See Espafila solicita formalmente asistencia financiera para la banca espafilola [Spain
Formally Solicits Financial Assistance for the Spanish Banking Sector], MINISTERIO DE
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in July 24, 2012 (637 basis points). After the now famous Draghi
declaration of August 2012 ("the ECB will do whatever it takes to save the
euro")6 5 the spreads have decreased, stabilizing around 200 basis points
(at the time of this writing, October 2014, they are around 150 basis
points) (see Figure 15, infra p. 368).
Figure 15: Spain risk premium (spread between the 10-year
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Source: See Spain Risk Premium, COUNTRYECONOMY.COM, http://countryeconomy.com/ risk-
premium/spain (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
What about Spanish export prospects? Since the crisis started in 2007,
Spain has experienced a considerable reduction in its current account
deficit. In 2009, the Spanish current account deficit was 50.5 billion euros,
while in 2012 it was 11.5 billion euros. IMF reports, however, indicate that
in 2013 Spain witnessed the first current account surplus since it joined
ECONOMIA U COMETITIVIDAD (June 25, 2012) http://www.lne.es/
elementosWeb/gestionCajas/MMP/File/cartaayuda.pdf (exhibiting the text of the formal letter
of request for financial assistance).
65. See Draghi, supra note 27.
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the euro (1 percent GDP), and it estimates that this trend will even
reinforce in the next years.66 All this seems to point in the right direction.
However, a closer look gives ground for a more nuanced and less
optimistic analysis. As the IMF points out, the Spanish export sector is
now behaving worse than it was expected. Thus, after the rebound that
exports experienced from 2012 to 2013, the exports prospects will stabilize
or even decline, according to the IMF estimates, until 2019. This happens
in a context in which imports are behaving better, due to the increase in
domestic demand. However, the domestic demand prospects will only
slightly ameliorate as far as the IMF estimates go. In addition, if one takes
into account the impressive public and private accumulated debt that
Spain holds, as well as its austerity policies, then it comes as no surprise
that all international institution forecasts of Spanish growth keep
insisting that the recent Spanish economic recovery remains fragile. Thus,
according again to the IMF, Spain would have timidly started to grow at
the end of 2013. Although this growth trend would tend to consolidate in
the years to come, the growth rate would be rather thin, at least until 2019
(2 percent).6
7
66. See IMF, SPAIN: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION 41 (IMF
Country Report No. 14/192, 2014).
67. To the best of my knowledge, the most updated computation of the growth threshold
needed by the Spanish economy to create net employment is the work of Patricia de Cea et al.,
Output Growth Thresholds for Job Creation and Unemployment Reduction in Spain 15 (2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://baobab.uc3m.es/monet/
monnet/IMG/pdf/OutputGrowthThresholds for Job Creation and UnemploymentReducti
on inSpain_-Patricia de Cea Sarabia.pdf (establishing that a GDP growth rate of 1.35%
would allow for net employment creation in Spain and that, in order to stop unemployment
from growing, a modest GDP growth rate of 0.26% would be enough). See also Juan Jose
Dolado, Crecimiento del PIB y el empleo [Growth of GDP and Employment] EL PAlS (Jan. 12,
2014), available at http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2014/01/11/
actualidad/1389472783_657936.html (lowering the threshold established in Patricia de Cea's
article and arguing that it would be enough with a GDP growth rate of 1% to create net
employment -he however argues that a rate of 0.3% would be necessary to stop unemployment
from growing-). See also Daniel Fuentes Castro, 2Cudnto tiene que crecer la economia espahola
para generar empleo? [How Much does the Spanish Economy Have to Grow to Generate
Employment?], WWW.ELDIARIO.ES (Mar. 5, 2014, 8:36 AM), available at
http://www.eldiario. es/zonacritica/crecer-economia-espanola-generar-empleo_6_
233486658.html (casting doubts as to the soundness of the previous figures).
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Figure 16: Spain's exports of goods and services, internal demand,
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Source: IMF: Spain 2014 Article IV Consultation (July 2014).
The main consequences derived from the previous picture are not only
of macroeconomic significance. They also have a social dimension, and this
is the fourth element I would add to Haussman and Velascos's triad. I
refer, in particular, to the redistribution of the costs of economic
adjustment that has to take place in the middle of the storm. When the
risk is too high that these costs will be distributed in a more uneven way
than in the alternative exit scenario, then the alternative should be
considered. Equality considerations are not only based on moral grounds,
but inequality may also have an impact on growth.68 For example, in the
68. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Belknap Press ed. 2014) (exploring the growth of wealth and wealth distribution in
recent times). However, Pikettys oceanic work does not directly deal with the main
consequences that this trend could have in the future for the world or at least for the
developed world. Other authors have however engaged in this discussion. See JONATHAN D.
OSTRY ET AL., REDISTRIBUTION, INEQUALITY, AND GROWTH 4 (IMF Staff Discussion Note
SDN/14/02, 2014) (analyzing the question of whether inequality is negatively correlated to
growth. According to these authors, "lower net inequality seems to drive faster and more
durable growth for a given level of redistribution.") Still other authors have analyzed the
impact of inequality not on growth but on societies' well-being and prosperity. See RICHARD
WILKINSON ET & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY EQUALITY IS BETTER FOR EVERYONE,
(Penguin ed. 2010) (finding correlation between inequality and poor health performance
(among other indicators of social well-being)).Whatever the merit of all these works, it is
submitted that they probably fail to address, at least in a more direct way, what is the most
important facet in the debate on inequality: its potential for domination or exploitation.
Pikettys work only very indirectly addresses this issue. According to him, high inequality
indexes are worrisome since they have a potential to become "socially destabilising." PIKETTY,
supra, at 10. The sense in which inequality can be socially destabilizing is however not further
discussed in Pikettys and it is probably more clearly expressed in Marnes Capital (whom
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Spanish case, the country was the second most unequal country of both
the Eurozone and the European Union in 2012, right behind Latvia. Thus,
if we take the GINI coefficient (see Figure 17, infra p. 371), Spain had a
coefficient of 35 and Latvia of 35.7. A more worrisome point that is
illustrated in Figure 18 is that after a period of relatively consistent
reduction of inequalities in the country, at least as measured by the GINI
index, the beginning of the crisis in 2008 precisely marked the reversal of
the previous trend (Spain's GINI coefficient was 31 in 2004 and, as has
been said, 35 in 2012).






Piketty cites on this point). See KARL MARX, CAPITAL 490 (Student ed. 2014) (according to
whom "the law of capitalistic accumulation, metamorphosed by economists into pretended law
of Nature, in reality merely states that the very nature of accumulation excludes every
diminution in the degree of exploitation of labour .. ")
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Figure 18: GINI index, evolution over time (2005-2012)
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Source: Eurostat (2014).
Furthermore, in regarding not just income distribution but how
income is distributed between the richest twenty percent and the eighty
percent at the bottom in Spain, the results are also alarming. In this
regard, the S80/S20 ratio shows that Spain is the most unequal country in
terms of income distribution, this time in both the Eurozone and the
European Union (see Figure 19, 2012 data, infra p. 373). Thus the Spanish
coefficient in 2012 was 7.2 points (it was 5.2 in 2004), whereas the
European Union and the Eurozone average were 5.0 points. It is
interesting to note that the analysis of both indexes (GINI and S80/S20)
shows a more surprising outcome, which is that although inequality has
dramatically increased in Spain since the crisis started, the EU average
has remained almost unchanged over the years. (In 2004 the GINI score
was 30.0 for the EU, where in 2012, it was 30.4.) The same happens with
the S80/S20 index. In 2004 the coefficient was 4.8, whereas in 2012 it was
5.0. Therefore, it would seem that the crisis does not inexorably mean that
equality has to be negatively affected (see Figure 20, infra p. 374).
In this particular respect, it is interesting to take the following
example. Portugal, a country severely hit by the crisis (and one that has
received a full bailout), not only fares better than Spain in regards to the
S80/S20 and GINI indexes, but its position even ameliorated at the
beginning of the crisis, although there seems to be a reversal of this trend
POTENTIAL EXIT FROM THE EUROZONE
since 2010. The point is that before the crisis, Portugal presented higher
GINI and S80/S20 coefficients than Spain. As regards GINI, Portugal had
a coefficient of 37.8 in 2004 (Spain's GINI was 31, thus a difference of
almost 7 points). In 2012, Portugal's GINI was 34.5, whereas Spain's was
35. And as regards the S80/S20 index, the numbers are almost swapped
for both countries: Portugal's coefficient was 7, whereas Spain's was 5.2 in
2004 (they were, in 2012, 5.8 and 7.2, respectively). To be sure,
unemployment plays a role here: the unemployment rate in Spain being
much higher than that in Portugal since the crisis started. Portugal is
interesting in this regard, since unemployment has not ceased to grow in
this country (granted, to a lesser degree than in Spain) since the crisis
exploded. However, even under growing unemployment, inequality is
lower in this country than in Spain. In sum, a crisis does not always have
to translate into more inequality, but in Spain it has.
6 9









69. See ADA FERRER-I-CARBONELL ET AL., GROWING INEQUALITIES AND ITS IMPACTS IN
SPAIN, GROWING INEQUALITIES' IMPACTS (GINI) 31(2013), available at http://www.gini-
research.org/system/uploads/612/original/CR-Spain-v2.pdf? 1400771292 (arguing that
'although there is a correspondence between unemployment rates and inequality trends, the
impact of unemployment onto inequality is not well studied, although the unemployment
differences across socio-economic status seems a contributor to inequality').
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Figure 20: S80/S20 index over time
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Source: Eurostat (2014).
The fact that inequality is growing in Spain is illustrative of another
point: the crisis is having winners and losers in this country. It is therefore
important to identify which groups belong to each of these categories and
how Spain exiting the euro could have an impact on them. Though much
research still needs to be done in this area, 70 at least in theory, it is
possible to say that rentiers (people who obtain their income from capital,
and within this group, above all savers) are doing much better than people
who obtain their income from labor, if we set aside top executives (to
whom one could add top sportsmen and women). 71
70. See Olga Salido Cort6s, Los ciudadanos espafoles ante la crisis [Spanish Citizens
Before the Crisis] 36 (Fundaci6n Alternativas, Working Paper No. 178, 2012), available at
http://www.consumo-ccu.es/informes/estudioCiudadanosCrisis.pdf (analyzing how the
economic crisis has impacted upon inequality in Spain).
71. I define capital in the way Piketty does in his book. First of all, Piketty excludes, for
the right reasons in my opinion, human capital from the rest of capital. Therefore he defines
national capital as "the total market value of everything owned by the residents and
government of a given country at a given point in time, provided that it can be traded on some
market." See PIKETTY, supra note 68, at 48. Basically, Piketty distinguishes between financial
(deposits, bonds, stocks, pension funds, etc.) and non-financial capital (real estate, machinery,
infrastructure, etc.). Id. He also distinguishes between private and public capital, thus the
capital owned by private persons (be them legal persons) and the capital owned by the
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Therefore, leaving the euro would imply a devaluation of the new
Spanish currency, and thus, the purchasing power of all these groups
would be affected. To give a number of examples, it is clear that income
from labor would be affected by the adjustment of the new currency to a
different equilibrium in its exchange rate due to depreciation. However,
financial assets owners would be affected as well since the value of their
assets would be accordingly depreciated. Savings would also be affected by
the change of currency and, therefore, by the ensuing depreciation. This is
an important point since, as Piketty shows, savings is one of the keys if not
the key to understanding the increase of the share of income from capital
that Europe has experienced since the 1970s.72 Only those Spanish
residents who have invested in the euro or in other currencies abroad
would be less impacted by the change (and might even benefit from it).7
3
The point is clear: although there would also be losers and winners, exiting
the euro would probably have the effect of generating a fairer distribution
of the costs of adjustment than its alternative-remaining in it. So if Spain
left the euro, more groups would be affected by the adjustment derived
from this event; therefore, making it possible to argue that the differential
in terms of equality would not be as important as it is today in this
country. Exit and devaluation would thus be a fairer shock absorber.
The conclusion that we can draw from this section is at least the
following: first, the three variables that Haussman and Velasco point to
are the key variables a country has to take into account when deciding to
react to adversity through exit. Time will be a crucial element here, since
the sooner a state makes up its mind on this issue, the better. However,
the benchmark will not only be economic growth, but also how even in
both scenarios the share of the adjustment burden will be.
government. Id. When I refer to the "winners" of the adjustment process that is taking place
in Spain (and in other EU countries) I am thinking first and foremost in the former and not in
the latter (in private capital rather than in public capital) since, as Piketty shows, while the
second one has become stagnant since the 1970s (when it has not decreased) in Europe, the
first one has augmented in a substantial way in this period. Id.
72. See PIKETTY, supra note 68, at 169-70.
73. This sector is however not negligible in economic terms. An indication of this is given
by the UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 209
(2014), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf (according to the
UNCTAD, Spanish Foreign Direct Investment outward stock was 643.226 million dollars in
2013, which represents the equivalent of 46% of Spanish GDP. As is known, FDI measures
investments made abroad by companies or entities from one particular country, in this case,
Spain. The volumes are therefore probably larger since FDI does not take into account the
assets held by Spanish private persons abroad).
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CONCLUSION
Whether Spain will leave the Eurozone is something that only time
will tell. At the time of this writing, Germany and France are experiencing
slow economic growth, and Italy is in a new recession. 74 Furthermore, the
whole euro area is probably experiencing a deflationary trend.75 In this
context, a triple-dip recession in the whole euro area, and in particular in
Spain, could not be completely discarded. 76 The issue of Spain and its
membership to the Eurozone could, therefore, reemerge in the close future.
In any case, as the previous analysis shows, the country fits well within
the profile of countries that historically have had more propensity to leave
currency unions (or similar arrangements). Furthermore, this Member
State clearly has its currency overvalued in real terms, and it is still
subject to considerable financial constriction, while showing vulnerabilities
in terms of its export sector (although this is probably the area in which
the country is having better results). Above all, the most worrying outcome
in the preceding analysis is that inequality has been growing at a
blistering pace since the crisis started. Finally, and based on our analysis
of the Argentinian and Korean cases, it is clear that exiting the euro would
only be a first step, which would have to be accompanied by further
structural reforms. The country's credibility to make such reforms is what
is at stake here.
74. See Eurostat, Gross Domestic Product Volumes, EC.EUROPA.EU, available at
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.dotab-table&init l&language-en&pcode-teina01
1&plugin-1 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (exhibiting the percentage change, with respect to the
previous quarter, in the Gross Domestic Product of the second quarter of 2014). See also
Eurostat, First Estimate for the Second Quarter of 2014, EC.EUROPA.EU, available at
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITYPUBLIC/2-05092014-AP/EN/2-05092014-AP-
EN.PDF (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (exhibiting the Euroindicators for the 5th of September,
2014). According to both sources, Germany experienced, in the second quarter of 2014, a
growth rate of -0.2%, France of 0.0% and Italy a -0.2%. Id. Italy is therefore technically back
into recession, since this is the second consecutive quarter in which this Member State
experiences a negative growth rate.
75. See Inflation forecasts, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/indic/forecast/html/table hist hicp.en.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2015) (according to the ECB's forecasts, the euro-area inflation rate will be of 0.7% in
the third quarter of 2014. Further, the ECB estimates that the euro-area inflation rate will
align around 2% (which is the ECB self-imposed target) not before 2019).
76. In this vein, see Joaquin Almunia, Spanish Commissioner for Competition, Address at
the Nueva Economia Forum available at http://www.abc.es/economia/20140929/abci-almunia-
alerta-europa-esta-201409291159.html (stating "Europa no estd fuera de riesgo de sufrir una
tercera recesi6dn" [Europe is not out of risk of suffering a third recession]).
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At a more general level, and based on our previous discussion of the
Spanish case, we may create a sort of "determinants checklist" that
Member States of the Eurozone might be willing to take into account when
or if considering exit. The first question a country has to answer is
whether it is sufficiently big, rich, and democratic to afford exit. The
second question a country has to answer is how the country fares in terms
of its real effective exchange rate, its capacity to borrow on the
international markets, and its export prospects. If the country is in a
downward spiral as a consequence of an overvalued currency, high
external debt, and low export prospects, then time will be an important
consideration in this context. The country's ability to make a more even
distribution of the costs of the adjustment together with its capacity to
make reforms once it is outside the Eurozone should also be included in
this equation.
